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The vast majority of micro and small enterprises in 
developing countries are located in industrial clusters, and 
the majority of such clusters have yet to see their growth 
take off. The performance of micro and small enterprise 
clusters is especially low in Sub-Saharan Africa. While 
existing studies often attribute the poor performance to 
factors outside firms, problems within firms are seldom 
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scrutinized. Entrepreneurs in these clusters are unfamiliar 
with standard business practices. Based on a randomized 
experiment in Ghana, this study demonstrates that basic-
level management training improves business practices 
and performance, although the extent of improvement 
varies considerably among entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are widely recognized as a major source of 
employment  and  income  in  developing  countries.    If  they  grow  in  size,  they  would 
contribute more to economic growth and poverty reduction.    In reality, however, their 
productivity remains low and their sizes remain small (e.g., Mead and Liedholm, 1998, 
Tybout,  2000).    While  their  low  performances  may  be  attributed  to  the  unfavorable 
circumstances surrounding them, recent empirical studies have identified problems within 
firms, especially problems regarding management (e.g., Bloom et al., 2010; Bruhn, Karlan, 
and Schoar, 2010).     
Management  has  been  increasingly  recognized  as  a  major  determinant  of 
productivity in the recent economics literature (e.g., Syverson, 2010).    Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007, 2010) collected data on management practices from a number of medium-
sized  firms  in  developed  and  fast-growing  countries  to  establish  a  close  association 
between  management  and  productivity.    Using  unique  data,  Ichinowski,  Shaw,  and 
Prennushi (1997), Lazear (2000), and Bertrand and Schoar (2003), among others, show 
that human resource management and top executives’ management style are important 
determinants of productivity in the U.S.     
To establish causality more directly, Karlan and Valdivia (2011), Drexler, Fischer, 
and Schoar (2010), and Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010) have carried out randomized 
control trials in which management training or a consulting service is provided for MSEs 
in their study sites in Latin America.    The most clear-cut result of these experiments is 
that  rudimentary,  as  opposed  to  standard,  management  training  improves  business 
practices.    This indicates that many MSE entrepreneurs in developing countries know 
little about management.    A somewhat discouraging result of the experiments, however,   3 
is that the impacts of the management training and consulting on sales and profits are 
economically large but are statistically weak. 
This  paper  attempts  to  extend  this  line  of  research  by  using  experimental  data 
gathered before and after a management training program offered to MSEs in Africa.    In 
our view, MSE entrepreneurs’ lack of management knowledge has a great deal to do with 
their location choices.    Although the existing studies do not specify where their subjects 
are located, we suspect that they are located in industrial clusters because the vast majority 
of MSEs in developing countries are located in industrial clusters, that is, the geographic 
concentration of a number of firms producing similar and related products.    Industrial 
clusters are spontaneously formed in a wide range of countries and sectors because of the 
benefits of localization economies (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).    As documented in recent 
case studies, localization economies in clusters allow new entrants with little managerial 
and financial capital to start businesses (e.g., Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Ruan and Zhang, 
2009;  Sonobe  and  Otsuka,  2006,  2010).    Moreover,  like  human  capital,  managerial 
capital may well be underinvested in due to failures in markets for knowledge and finance.   
Thus, it is not surprising that MSE entrepreneurs lack the basic knowledge and skills of 
management.    Nonetheless, it is likely that many of them are now willing to learn about 
management  because  the  profitability  of  their  businesses  have  been  declining  due  to 
intensified  competition  with  an  increasing  number  of  new  entrants  producing  similar 
products and the massive import of cheap products from newly industrialized economies. 
This  study  provides  an  elementary  management  training  program  for  MSE 
entrepreneurs in an industrial cluster.    It examines whether they are willing to learn about 
management and to what extent the training improves the performance of their businesses.   
We find that the vast majority of the entrepreneurs invited to the training program attended   4 
the training sessions in earnest, and many adopted the management practices taught in the 
program.  As  with  the  existing  studies,  however,  we  find  that  the  estimated  average 
effects of the training on the sales and profits of the participants are economically large but 
statistically insignificant.    In the experiment carried out by Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 
(2010), the provision of consulting services to MSEs was expected to improve the clients’ 
business performance, but statistically, the effects were only marginally significant.    The 
authors attribute this result to noisy data and the relatively small sample size.    In our 
experiment, the cause of the statistically weak effect of the training on the participants’ 
business results seems to lie in the heterogeneity among them.    The training increased the 
percentage  of  participants  adopting  the  recommended  practices  from  near  zero  to  50 
percent,  but  the  rest  of  the  participants  did  not  even  attempt  to  adopt  the  practices.   
Moreover, there is a sub-sample in which the estimated effects are highly significant, and 
even within this  sub-sample, the training effect is  highly heterogeneous.    Thus, some 
participants benefit greatly from the training, while others do not.   
The next section reviews the studies of industrial clusters in developing countries 
and clarifies the questions to be addressed in this paper.  Section 3 describes the sampling 
scheme  and  the  training  design,  and  Section  4  presents  the  basic  statistics.    After 
specifying the regression models, Section 5 reports the estimation results and discusses the 
directions of possible estimation biases due to attrition, spillovers, market stealing, and 
psychological effects.    Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications for future research.   
 
2. Location and management of MSEs 
Casual observations suggest that the vast majority of MSEs in developing countries 
are  located  in  industrial  clusters  including  small  clusters  of  furniture  makers  along   5 
roadsides, garment markets in which tailors are producing and selling clothes, and the like.  
The benefits of localization economies, which attract MSEs to industrial clusters, include 
favorable access to market information, low transaction costs due to easy monitoring and 
the effective functioning of the reputation mechanism among firms located near each other, 
and the resulting development of the division of labor among manufacturers and between 
manufacturers and traders (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006). 
Case studies of industrial clusters in Asia, Latin America, and Africa suggest that 
clusters in different industries in different countries follow the same development path 
until they reach a certain phase and then the path bifurcates, as illustrated in Figure 1 (e.g., 
Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006, 2010).  An industry is born in a 
developing  country  when  a  cheap  imitated  substitute  of  an  imported  product  wins 
popularity in a local market.    An industrial cluster is formed as an increasing number of 
new firms begin producing imitated products near the pioneer’s location.    As new firms 
enter the cluster, the division of labor is developed in the cluster, each specializing in a 
narrow segment of a value chain, with only a narrow range of skills and a small initial 
investment in fixed and working capital (Ruan and Zhang, 2009).     
Thus, a cluster attracts a swarm of new entrants, and the increased scale of the 
cluster reinforces localization economies.    Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, 2010) refer to this 
phase of industrial development as the quantity expansion phase since the expansion of the 
cluster is based on the new entry of imitators without qualitative improvement in products 
or production processes.    In this phase, owners do not keep records of transactions or 
inventory  (e.g.,  de  Mel,  McKenzie,  and  Woodruff,  2009),  and  they  fail  to  separate 
financing for their businesses with that of their own households.    Even casual observers 
notice that in their disorganized workshops, owners and workers waste time looking for   6 
necessary tools and materials on a daily basis.    These owners are not managers in the real 
sense of the term.    Still, they are able to maintain their small businesses.    Because every 
transaction and activity takes place in full view of the owners, small businesses are easy to 
operate.     
The  increase  in  the  supply  of  homogeneous  low-quality  products  due  to  the 
proliferation of imitative firms will sooner or later saturate the local market.    The product 
price  and  profitability  will  eventually  decline,  as  illustrated  by  curves  AB  and  CD  in 
Figure  1.    Declining  profitability  induces  entrepreneurs  to  attempt  product  quality 
improvements.    According to case studies, successful quality improvement involves the 
establishment  of  brand  names,  the  development  of  new  marketing  channels  and  the 
introduction of a standard management system with stricter control of product quality and 
work effort, and the establishment of trust-based long-term subcontracting relationships 
with parts-suppliers (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006).    For such multifaceted improvements, it 
is  important  to  gain  knowledge  about  technology  and  management  from  outside  the 
cluster and to take advantage of the pool of human resources within the cluster, such as 
traders,  engineers,  and  parts-suppliers.    With  the  progression  of  quality  improvement, 
successful firms become larger and the total number of firms decreases through exits and 
mergers of inefficient firms, as illustrated by curves BE and DF.     
If  a  cluster  fails  in  quality  improvement,  however,  profitability  will  continue  to 
decline until new entry ceases, as illustrated by the two broken lines in Figure 1.    Firms 
will  continue  to  produce  the  same  low-quality  product,  and  their  ways  of  running 
businesses will remain far from systematic and efficient.    When local economies were 
closed  to  international  trade,  firms  could  survive  without  difficulty.    In  the  era  of 
globalization,  however,  they  face  competition  with  foreign  producers  who  improve   7 
products or reduce costs incessantly.    The literature on industrial clusters report several 
cases in which negative external shocks turned out to be blessings in disguise in the sense 
that they triggered multifaceted improvements within clusters.
1    In many other clusters, 
however, negative external shocks have worsened the downward trend in profitability, and 
firms are struggling to survive (e.g., Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Kennedy, 1999; 
McCormick, 1999; Akoten and Otsuka, 2007). 
Thus, a cluster may either enter the quality improvement phase or stay as a survival 
cluster.  A major hypothesis is that among the important determinants of a cluster’s fate is 
the management knowledge of the entrepreneurs in the cluster.    This study examines to 
what extent basic management training can improve the business practices and business 
results of firms in a survival cluster.    The evaluation of the full effect of the training will 
require several rounds of follow-up surveys.    At this stage of research where we have 
completed only the first post-training survey, we can only analyze the short-run effects.     
According to the literature on technology diffusion, the same technology is adopted 
by different adopters several years apart, and a major explanation for such a phenomenon 
is that different adopters put different values on the new technology (e.g., Hall and Khan 
2003).    Likewise,  management  training  participants  will  be  heterogeneous  in  both 
incentive and in the ability to put the knowledge they learn from the training into practice.   
Moreover, their business results will be subject to idiosyncratic shocks.    Thus, we expect 
that  the  effect  of  the  training  on  business  results  will  vary  considerably  among  the 
participants.     
If management training proves to be useful for at least some participants, a question 
arises as to whether the benefit is large enough to justify the cost of the training.    For this 
reason, we focus on the short-run private benefit because the benefits and losses for non-  8 
participants, neighbors, and consumers (i.e., social welfare) are practically impossible to 
capture in the data.    In short, this paper examines the effects of a managerial training 
program on participating entrepreneurs’ business practices and performance and compares 
the cost and private benefit of such a program. 
 
3. Surveys and training program 
Our study site is Suame Magazine, located in Kumasi, the second largest city in 
Ghana.    Kumasi is a junction of the artery roads connecting the major coastal cities and 
the major inland cities including Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso.
2  Suame 
Magazine is known in West Africa as a large cluster of garage mechanics, but it is also a 
cluster of metalwork enterprises producing a variety of metal products, such as bolts and 
nuts, corn mill machines, threshing machines, and cash safes.
3    The garage cluster has 
had a long period of quantitative expansion because the demand for car repair services has 
increased dramatically.    As the garage cluster expanded, scrap metal became increasingly 
available, helping the expansion of the metalwork cluster.     
We conducted a survey of metalwork entrepreneurs in early 2005.    In those days, 
most masters, whether garage mechanics or metalwork entrepreneurs, were members of 
the Suame branch of the Ghana National Association of Garages (GNAG).    As shown in 
Table 1, the number of members in 2003 exceeded 10,000, of which more than 1,000 were 
metalwork  entrepreneurs.    The  number  of  metalwork  entrepreneurs  does  not  seem  to 
have increased since then.    As will be shown in Table 3 below, the profitability in this 
cluster began decreasing clearly in the early 2000s.    The metalwork cluster in Suame 
Magazine was a typical survival cluster except for the extraordinarily large size of the 
annexed  garage  cluster.    For  the  survey,  we  selected  167  metalwork  entrepreneurs   9 
randomly  from  the  GNAG  member  list.    Their  data  on  educational  and  occupational 
backgrounds, production and costs, marketing channels, and investments were gathered by 
visiting each of them (Iddrisu, 2007).     
The  training  program  was  implemented  for  three  weeks  from  the  middle  of 
November,  2007.
4  The  program  consisted  of  three  modules  of  classroom  training: 
Module 1 on entrepreneurship, business planning, and marketing; Module 2 on production 
management  and quality management;  and Module 3 on record keeping  and costing.
5  
Each module lasted for five weekdays, 2.5 hours per day.    The venue was the Suame 
Branch of the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) in the cluster, so that busy 
entrepreneurs could attend the class after work.     
The instructors were three Ghanaian consultants with extensive experience.    They 
were selected through an international  competitive tender, based both  on  the cost  and 
quality of their submitted proposal, following the World Bank’s procurement guidelines.
6  
They  spoke  the  local  language,  Twi,  and  thus  communicated  smoothly  with  the 
participants.  Modules 1 and 3 were based on the textbooks of the improve-your-business 
(IYB)  and  start-your-business  (SYB)  training  program  developed  by  the  International 
Labor Organization (ILO).    IYB and SYB are implemented as standard business training 
modules in many developing countries.    Our instructors emphasized the importance of 
identifying good customers, separating business and household finances, keeping records, 
and other very basic practices.    The training hours were allocated almost evenly to the 
instructors’ lectures and to group work and debates.   
The contents of Module 2 are not as standard as those of Modules 1 and 3, but they 
are as easy to understand.    This module begins with an explanation of the concepts of 
productivity  and  quality,  which  is  followed  by  discussions  regarding  the  difference   10 
between value adding and non-value adding activities, and the workplace housekeeping 
method called 5S.
7 The instructor also discusses an inexpensive approach to improving 
productivity and quality called KAIZEN.     
Before  selecting  the  entrepreneurs  to  invite  to  the  training  program,  we  were 
advised by an expert that the number of participants should be 60 or less.    Since we had 
already committed ourselves to inviting seven entrepreneurs who had assisted in our study, 
we  selected  53  other  entrepreneurs  randomly  from  the  sample  of  the  baseline  survey.   
The seven pre-selected participants are excluded from the analysis below. 
When we invited the selected entrepreneurs to the training program, we explained 
that the program was not related to any financial assistance to them.    Nonetheless, many 
of the participants expected to receive low-interest credits, according to our informants.  
They were disappointed to learn that such credits would not be extended to them, but they 
continued to attend class and became increasingly enthusiastic about learning toward the 
end of the program.
8 
The training program costs about 40,000 US dollars, which includes the hiring cost 
of the instructors, the cost of teaching material production, the cost of the instructors’ 
travel and hotel expenses, and the cost of renting the venue.    The cost of selecting the 
instructors and the researchers’ travel cost are not included in this amount.    The venue 
cost was very low because we were able to use the NVTI classroom for an insignificant 
amount.    If the total cost is divided by the number of the participants including the pre-
selected participants, the training cost per person will be just 741 US dollars for the 15 
days.    If we had to rent a function room at a hotel, the cost could have been about 1,100 
US dollars per person.   11 
A follow-up survey was conducted in November 2008, i.e., about a year after the 
training  sessions  were  completed.    We  attempted  to  visit  the  167  enterprises  in  the 
sample of the baseline survey and obtained data of 139 enterprises.    The attrition of 28 
sample entrepreneurs occurred due to a variety of causes.    One entrepreneur refused to 
cooperate with our survey, 13 enterprises had closed down. and the remaining 14 attritors 
were  missing  for  unknown  reasons.
9  These  28  attritors  had  not  been  invited  to  the 
training program.    That is, no attrition occurred in the treatment group.  We will discuss 
possible estimation bias due to the attrition in Section 5. 
Although  our  original  sample  included  foundry  men  casting  metal,  we  do  not 
include them in the sample used in the analysis below because the foundry business is 
distinct and because they received technical training from an aid agency in the same year.   
We  also  exclude  from  the  sample  several  entrepreneurs  who  were  ejected,  after  the 
training,  from  a  prime  location  which  they  had  occupied  without  permission.    As 
mentioned earlier, the seven pre-selected participants are also excluded from the sample.   
The attrition and these adjustments reduced the sample size to 113.   
      
4. Basic statistics 
As  shown  in  Table  2,  the  treatment  group  consists  of  47  entrepreneurs  and  the 
control  group  consists  of  66  entrepreneurs.    By  the  treatment  group,  we  mean  those 
entrepreneurs invited to attend the training program.    In the treatment group, there are six 
refusers, who did not attend the training at all or only attended the first two days.    The 
remaining  members  in  the  treatment  group  are  called  participants.    The  participants 
attended 14.1 days on average, and the majority recorded perfect attendance.  The high   12 
rates of participation and attendance are consistent with our hypothesis that entrepreneurs 
in survival clusters are willing to learn
 management practices. 
The treatment group and the control group share similar background attributes.    A 
typical entrepreneur is male, about 45 years old, from the Ashanti region, where the cluster 
is located, went to school for a little more than 10 years, learned the skill of the trade as an 
apprentice from a master of either fabrication or machining for three to four years, and has 
been operating his own business for nearly 14 years.    Fabricators are basically welders 
whereas machinists are basically lathe turners.    Many workshops have both fabricators 
and machinists because their activities are complementary.    We classify the entrepreneurs 
into these two types—fabricators and machinists—based on the original line of work that 
they were engaged in when they started their businesses.     
Table 2 shows that the refusers tended to be older than the participants.    Older 
entrepreneurs may have had higher time costs or lower expected benefits from the training 
than younger entrepreneurs.  Another characteristic of the refusers is that none of them 
are from outside the Ashanti region.    Local inhabitants would have greater involvement 
in extended family functions, community functions, and sideline businesses than those 
from other regions.    If this was the case, their opportunity costs would be higher.     
Table  3  reports  the  data  on  the  adoption  of  recommended  practices  and  three 
indicators of business performance.  The data on the situations in 2000 and 2002 are 
recall data collected in 2004.    The left side of the table shows the percentages of the 
entrepreneurs who visit customers periodically, kept records, and routinely analyzed the 
records in the specified year.    Visiting customers is not a common activity in this cluster, 
and the majority of the sample firms do not keep records.  Even if records are kept, they 
are seldom reviewed or analyzed.    The data on the adoption of production management   13 
practices are not shown in the table because we could not obtain useful data.    This is 
because few non-participants understood our questions about production management. 
After the training,  the percentage of firms  in  the control  group  keeping records 
increased by only 6 percentage points whereas the increase was 36 points in the treatment 
group.    Similarly,  the  adoption  rates  of  the  other  two  practices  (i.e.,  keeping  and 
analyzing records) increased much more in the treatment group than in the control group.   
These  results  indicate  that  the  training  had  strong  impacts  on  the  adoption  of  the 
recommended practices.    Another noteworthy  point is  that  well over  one third of the 
treatment group firms did not adopt the recommended practices.    The variance of each 
adoption  variable  within  the  treatment  group  increased  after  the  training  because  the 
variance of the dummy variable increases as the mean approaches 0.5. 
The right side of Table 3 reports the data on annual sales revenue, value added, and 
gross profit by  treatment  status.    Gross  profit here is  defined as  sales  revenue minus 
material cost and labor cost.    Because the majority of firms did not keep records, we 
estimated these financial variables by asking each entrepreneur about the number of pieces 
sold and their prices by product type, material inputs and material prices, payments to 
subcontractors, and payments to workers and apprentices.    We checked that the estimate 
of  gross  profit  was  consistent  with  the  entrepreneur’s  earnings,  investment,  living 
expenses, purchase of durable goods, and so on.
10 Written records, whenever available, 
were used deliberately, taking into account that each entrepreneur might have his own 
unique concept of costs and that his calculation might be incorrect.   
The trend of declining profitability is visible in Table 3.    Some respondents said 
definitely that this trend was set by the proliferation of competitors within the cluster, and 
that  it  was  being  worsened  by  massive  imports  of  similar  products  from  Asia  and   14 
increasing competition with similar clusters in the country.    Decreases in sales, and gross 
profits  after  the  training  were  somewhat  smaller  for  the  treatment  group  than  for  the 
control  group.    These  differences  in  the  mean  values  are  small  but  suggest  that  the 
training had favorable effects. 
The training seems to have impacts on equipment investment as well.    Note that 
this table shows investment amounts in GHS, whereas Table 3 shows the sales, value 
added, and gross profit in 1,000 GHS.    The median investment amount in each year is 
zero, i.e., the majority in each year undertakes no equipment investment.    Although the 
average of the investments by the fabricator control group is relatively high in 2008, the 
magnitude is not impressive for equipment investment even by the standard in the cluster.   
Sizable  investments  were  undertaken  by  three  machinist  participants,  who  purchased 
machine tools, and by a fabricator participant, who relocated his workshop to a better 
conditioned  site  outside  the  cluster  and  installed  new  machines.    As  a  result  of  the 
investment  in  machine  tools,  the  difference  in  investment  between  the  treatment  and 
control groups of machinists became significant at the 5 percent level after the training, as 
shown in Table 4.  The fabricator’s relocation is not reflected in the data because it took 
place a few months after the follow-up survey.     
Table 5 shows data on the practice adoption and financial outcomes in 2008 by 
treatment status and the initial line of business.    As the left side of the table shows, the 
fabricators and the machinists share similar patterns of practice adoption after the training.   
That is, the adoption rate is higher for the treatment group than for the control group.    As 
shown on the right side, the machinists have larger sales, value added, and gross profit 
than the fabricators, reflecting the fact that every machinist owns at least one machine tool, 
which is much more expensive than fabricators’ welding machines.  More importantly,   15 
the treatment group of both fabricators and machinists recorded greater means of sales, 
value added, and  gross  profit than the  control  group,  suggesting  that the training had 




The average effect of the training on the training participants’ outcome Y, which can 
be the adoption of a management practice or a financial variable, may be given by E(Y1i|Di 
= 1) – E(Y0i|Di = 1) or E(Y1i – Y0i|Di = 1), where Y1i is the outcome that entrepreneur i will 
have if he participate in the training, Y0i is the outcome that he will have if he does not 
receive the training, and Di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for participants and 0 for 
non-participants.  By definition, E(Y0i|Di = 1) is hypothetical and unobservable, but it 
may be replaced by E(Y0i|Di = 0), which is observable, if the participants are randomly 
selected.    Note, however, that although invitation was randomized, participation was not, 
and that the invited participants decided themselves whether to participate.     
To  cope  with  self-selection  biases  and  take  advantage  of  the  randomization  in 
invitation, we resort to the framework of the local average treatment effect (LATE).  In 
this framework, a key role is played by the dummy variable Zi that is 1 if entrepreneur i 
was invited to the training and 0 otherwise.    Obviously, D and Z are closely associated 
because only the invited entrepreneurs could participate in the training.    Let D1i and D0i 
be the values of Di when Zi = 1 and when Zi = 0, respectively.    LATE is the average 
treatment effect on those whose treatment status is affected by random assignment (i.e., 
invitation in our case) and defined by   
   16 
  LATE = E[Y1i – Y0i |D1i ≠ D0i].                 (1) 
 
Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that if Y1i, Y0i, D1i, and D0i, are independent of Zi and if 
D1i ≥ D0i, for all i (monotonicity),   
 
  LATE = Cov(Yi, Zi) / Cov(Di, Zi).              (2) 
 
Since all the participants in our program were invited, D0i is 0 and D1i is either 0 or 
1.    Those invited entrepreneurs with  D1i  = 0  are  refusers  and those  with  D1i = 1 are 
participants.    Thus, D1i ≠ D0i in equation (1) means that entrepreneur i will participate in 
the training if invited, and LATE in our case is equivalent to E[Y1i – Y0i|Di = 1], i.e., the 
average  training  effect  on  the  participants.    It  is  easy  to  show  that  the  monotonicity 
condition is satisfied in our case.    Equation (2) implies that LATE can be estimated as 
coefficient  in a regression model, Yi =  + Di + i, by using Zi as an instrumental 
variable (IV).    In our case, the sample size is small and, hence, it is advisable to use the 
pre-training data as well as entrepreneurs’ attributes as follows: 
 
Yit =  + DiTt + Xit + iDi + t + ui + it ,                 (3) 
 
where subscript t denotes year 2000, 2002, 2004, or 2008, Tt is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if year t is after the training (i.e., t = 2008), Xit is a vector of the entrepreneur’s 
background  attributes  (which  are  mostly  time  invariant),  t  is  a  year  effect,  ui  is  an 
unobserved individual effect, and it is an error term.    The average training effect on the 
participants, , is estimated by using Zi and ZiTi as instruments.   
The  magnitude  of  the  training  effect  may  vary  from  participant  to  participant.   
Heterogeneous training effects may be captured by adding WitDiTt and WitDi to equation   17 
(3), where Wit is one of the variables in vector Xit, such as the education variables (years of 
schooling and a high education dummy), age, the apprenticeship experience dummy, and 
the  Ashanti  dummy.  This  attempt  turned  out  to  be  most  successful  when  Wit  is  the 
dummy variable Mi indicating whether entrepreneur i is a machinist or a fabricator.    This 
variant of the model may be written   
 
Yit =  + F(1 – Mi)DiTt+ MiDiTt + Xit +F(1 – Mi)Di + MiDi + t + ui + it , (4) 
 
where F is the average training effect on the fabricators who participated in the training, 
and M is that on the machinist participants. 
 
5-2. Estimation results 
The  results  of  the  estimation  of  equation  (3)  can  be  summarized  briefly.    The 
training  had  positive  and  significant  effects  on  the  participants’  adoption  of  the 
recommended practices.    The training effects on their sales, value added, or gross profit 
are positive and economically large but statistically insignificant.     
In the estimation of equation (4), the first-stage dependent variables are (1 – Mi)DiTt, 
MiDiTt, (1 – Mi)Di, and MiDi.    Since Di and Zi are closely correlated, the instruments, (1 – 
Mi)ZiTt,  MiZiTt,  (1  –  Mi)Zi,  and  MiZi,  have  highly  significant  coefficients,  where  the 
regression  model  is  specified  as  a  fixed-effects  model  or  a  random-effects  model.   
Consistent with Table 2, the age variable and the Ashanti dummy variable have negative 
and significant coefficients in the regressions of (1 – Mi)Di and MiDi, when the model is 
specified as the random-effects model.    No other variables have significant coefficients in 
the first-stage regressions.   18 
The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 6. Panel A presents 
the  full  results  of  the  random-effects  model  estimation.    Panel  B  reports  only  the 
estimates  of    because  the  fixed-  and  random-effects  models  share  very  similar 
estimates.
11  In  the  first  three  columns,  the  dependent  variables  are  the  dummies 
indicating whether the recommended practices were adopted.    In the last three columns, 
the  dependent  variables  are  sales,  value  added,  and  gross  profit,  which  are  not 
logarithmic but in 1,000 USD units. 
The estimated average effects of the training on the participants are shown in the 
first two rows.    In the first three columns, they are positive and significant at the five or 
one percent level for both fabricators and machinists.    The average training effect on 
record  keeping  is  particularly  strong  among  the  fabricators,  but  it  is  significant  also 
among the machinists.    Note, however, that the training effect on participants’ adoption 
of  the  practices  is  not  homogeneous  even  within  either  the  fabricator  group  or  the 
machinist group.    This is clear from Table 5 because one third to half of the participants 
in each group did not adopt the practices.        
In the last three columns, the estimated average effects of the training are positive 
and significant at the five percent level for the fabricators, but they are not significant for 
the machinists.    Training  participation  increased the gross  profit of the  fabricators  by 
15,000 USD on average, which is much more than 100 percent of their average gross 
profit.    In the case of the machinists, the average effect is only 2,600 USD, or 10 percent 
of their average profit.    The estimate of M has a standard error twice as large as the 
estimate of F.    The low mean and the large variance of the estimated effect suggest that 
the  training  benefited  only  a  few  among  the  machinist  participants.    There  are  two 
possible explanations, even though they are not supported by compelling evidence at this   19 
stage  of  research.    First,  according  to  our  open-ended  interviews  with  the  sample 
entrepreneurs, the machinists in the study sites had hardships during the period from the 
training and the follow-up survey.    For example, thread cutting dies, one of the most 
important  tools  for  machinists,  continued  to  be  in  extremely  short  supply  during  this 
period.    It  may  well  be  that  the  training  program  did  not  provide  solutions  for  the 
struggling machinists. 
Second, the training effects on business results may be related to the training effect 
on record keeping practices, which is stronger for the fabricators than for the machinists, 
as shown in column (2).    Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2010) find that a  ―simplified, 
rule-of-thumb‖ training of accounting has significant impacts on business results.    The 
third  module  of  our  program  involved  exactly  such  basic  training  on  record  keeping.   
Before this training, the percentage of entrepreneurs who did not keep any  records of 
transactions and inventory was 67.6 percent for the machinists and as high as 85.7 percent 
for the fabricators.    Although it is not clear where this ex ante difference comes from, 
these results suggest that keeping records is often critical to improving business results of 
firms that have not kept any records. 
Another  noteworthy  result  is  that  the  years  of  schooling  have  positive  and 
significant effects on record keeping and business results.    These results are consistent 
with  the  findings  reported  by  Ramachandran  and  Shah  (1999)  from  Kenya,  Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, Mengistae (2006) from Ethiopia, and Akoten and Otsuka (2007) 
from Kenya, as well as the findings of numerous case studies in Asia. 
 
5-3. Economic magnitudes of the estimates 
The average training effect on the participants’ gross profit may be written E(1i –   20 
0i|Di = 1).    It is the pecuniary private benefit of the training per participant in the first 
year following  the training.    The hypothetical  gross profit  0i can be  regarded as  the 
opportunity cost.  As long as the training effects are felt in the years ahead, E(1i – 0i|Di 
= 1) is only a part of the private benefit.    In contrast, the training cost of 741 USD per 
participant is a one-time cost.    As reported above, E(1i – 0i|Di = 1) is estimated to be 
2,600 USD for a machinist and 15,000 USD for a fabricator, which are more than three 
times and about 20 times the training cost per participant, respectively. 
Another way to assess the economic magnitude of the training effect may be to 
compare it with the effect of education.    Our estimate of the increase in annual gross 
profit due to an additional year of schooling is 1,600 USD.    The management training 
amounts to 9.4 years of schooling in the case of the fabricators and 1.6 years of schooling 
in the case of the machinists, in terms of the impact on gross profit. 
 
5-4. Attrition bias   
Attrition is one of the sources of potential estimation bias.    The attritors account 
for 17 percent of the original sample.    About half of the attrititors closed their workshops 
and disappeared.    If their low performance was taken into account, the training effect 
would  be  estimated  more  strongly  because  no  one  in  the  treatment  group  closed  a 
workshop.  The rest of the attritors were missing for unknown reasons.    The direction of 
bias that the attritors of this type cause is open to question.   
 
5-5. Spillovers and market stealing 
In industrial clusters, knowledge spills over quickly.    Information on delinquents 
and  cheaters  spreads  rapidly.    Before  a  cluster  enters  the  quality  improvement  phase,   21 
firms produce almost the same products and share the same production processes because 
of  apprentice  training  and  emulation.    According  to  our  respondents,  the  training 
participants  talked  to  other  entrepreneurs  about  their  impressions  of  the  program,  the 
instructors, and the outline of the training contents.    Knowledge spillovers would reduce 
the  estimate  of  the  training  impacts  as  spillovers  improve  the  business  results  of  the 
control group, which in turn reduces Cov(Yi, Zi) in equation (2). 
As Bloom et al. (2007) point out, firms’ productivity improvement can affect other 
firms’ performance through market stealing as well as spillovers.    The first module of our 
training program encouraged the participants to be proactive in getting new customers.    A 
few  participants  told  us  that  soon  after  the  training,  they  began  issuing  invoices  and 
receipts on which their mobile phone numbers were printed, and they believed that the 
invoices and receipts doubled their sales compared with the previous year.    Their sales 
may have increased at the cost of other firms’ sales.    The market-stealing effect would 
overstate the training effects on the participants by worsening the business results of the 
control group.   
Nonetheless, it seems improbable that the estimates of the training effects on the 
participants are strongly affected by spillovers and market stealing.  Knowledge does not 
affect business results if it is not put into practice.    As shown in Table 3, the control 
group’s adoption rates in 2008 increased only a little in contrast to the significant increases 
among the treatment group in the same year.    Furthermore, not all the adopters would 
successfully assimilate the practices that they adopted.    Market stealing by a participant 
would worsen the business results of the other participants as well as the non-participants.   
To the extent that these negative effects canceled each other out, the estimation bias due to 
market stealing should be small.  The effect of spillovers and market stealing on the gap   22 
between the social and private benefits of the training seems weak for the same reasons. 
 
5-5. Psychological effects 
The increases in the control group’s adoption rates in 2008 may also be attributed to 
a psychological effect.    It is only human to show that one is doing well, even if this 
involves  some  pretense.    In  the  follow-up  survey,  some  entrepreneurs  may  have 
exaggerated how well their firms were doing.    Moreover, the control group may have 
been  loath  to  admit  that  they  failed  to  benefit  from  the  training  program.    It  is  not 
difficult  to  imagine  that  some  of  them  exaggerated  not  just  the  adoption  of  the 
recommended practices but also their business results.  The follow-up survey data on the 
participants may have a similar problem.    The participants may have been tempted to 
please us by exaggerating their benefits from the training program.    If both participants 
and non-participants exaggerated the adoption rates and business results, the net impact on 
the training effect estimates will be small.   
 
6. Conclusion 
As in the rest of the world, there are a number of industrial clusters in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but unlike clusters in other regions, these clusters have not yet achieved successful 
industrial  development.    Their  low  performances  have  been  attributed  exclusively  to 
factors  outside  firms,  such  as  poor  infrastructure  and  unfavorable  governance.    By 
contrast, problems within firms have seldom been scrutinized.    Based on a randomized 
controlled experiment in Ghana, this study demonstrates that entrepreneurs in a survival 
cluster are unfamiliar with standard business practices.    It also indicates that participation 
in  a  rudimentary  management  training  program  improves  the  business  practices  and   23 
results of the participants with considerably varying degrees of success.  Although we 
should be cautious about generalization, these results are highly consistent with the results 
of  earlier  studies  in  Latin  America.    It  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  entrepreneurs  in 
developing countries can improve the productivity of their MSEs by learning management 
techniques.     
In  earlier  studies,  the  estimated  training  effects  were  economically  large  but 
statistically insignificant or only marginally significant.    Our results suggest that such 
weak estimates come from the heterogeneity of the participants, in our case, between the 
fabricator group and the machinist group and within each of these groups.    Probably, 
entrepreneurs’  managerial  abilities  are  more  difficult  to  improve  than  workers’  skills.   
Unlike vocational training, a management training program may improve the managerial 
abilities of only a few participants.    Nonetheless, it may be worth providing from the 
social welfare point of view.    This is because the quality improvement phase of industrial 
development is led by a few innovative entrepreneurs, and their success contributes to the 
overall  social  welfare  through  external  effects  including  imitation  by  many  other 
entrepreneurs, as the literature on industrial clusters attests to.     
The results of this paper warrant considerable further research.    The longer-term 
training effects should be examined in future.    Our conjecture is that only a small number 
of  participants  will  continue  to  improve  their  business  performance  based  on  the 
knowledge acquired in the training.    Another direction to explore is to provide advanced 
training.    By providing elementary training, we have confirmed that entrepreneurs in the 
survival  phase  know  little  about  management.    Advanced  training  will  allow  us  to 
explore  what  factors  help  industrial  clusters  enter  the  quality  improvement  phase 
successfully.   24 
 
Notes 
1.  Examples include a surgical instrument cluster in Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999), a garment 
cluster  in  India  (Tewari,  1999),  and  shoe  clusters  in  Brazil  (Schmitz,  1999),  and 
Ethiopia (Sonobe et al., 2009). 
2.  This area used to be the site of an army depot called Magazine during the colonial 
times. The name Magazine has been adopted by similar engineering clusters in the 
northern part of Ghana, whereas those in the southern part are called Kokompes. 
3.  McCormick (1999) provides a bird’s-eye view of this cluster. 
4.  The training program was funded by the Government of Japan through its Policy and 
Human Resource Development (PHRD) trust fund at the World Bank. 
5.  The  program  was  modeled  on  the  ―Business  Course‖  provided  by  the  Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in eight transition economies; Cambodia, 
Kazakhstan, Laos, Mongolia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam. 
6.  The lead consultant was a SYB master trainer.    The instructor in charge of Module 2 
had received training in metalwork in Japan and was familiar with KAIZEN. 
7.  5S is named after the corresponding Japanese words whose Romanized forms begin 
with the letter s.    They are translated as sorting, straightening (or setting in order), 
systematic cleaning (or shining), standardizing, and sustaining (or self-discipline). 
8.  Including  the  pre-selected  participants,  the  majority  of  the  participants  recorded 
perfect attendance.    At the end of the program, the participants evaluated the program 
as follows: 98 percent found the program very important to their business, 94 percent 
had learnt very much, and 96 percent were satisfied with the program. 
9.  About a year later, we found that some of these attritors operating their own businesses.   25 
10. We usually began by asking about the price of each product and the output in a busy 
month and in a slack month, together with a question about when the workshop was 
busiest.    If the respondent was unsure, we changed tack and asked, for example, how 
many units of a product were produced from one unit of a material, and how often and 
how many units of the material were purchased in a busy month and a slack month. 
11. The Hausman specification test does not reject the consistency of the random-effects 
model estimator for the regressions of keeping records, analyzing records, value added, 
and gross profit as shown at the bottom of the table in columns (ii), (iii), (v), and (vi), 
even though the test results were not obtained for the other two regressions. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Enterprise Population in the Suame Magazine Cluster by Sector 
 
  Garages  Metalworking 
enterprises 
Others  Total 
2000  4,958  807  2,204  7,969 
2002  6,222  990  2,618  9,830 
2003  7,847  1139  2,844  11,830 
Notes.  These estimates are taken from the database of the Suame branch of the Ghana National 
Association of Garages (GNAG).    Estimates do not include ancillary trades such as restaurants 
and telecommunication shops.    ―Others‖ include truck body builders, pot makers, sign writers, 
and some types of welders. 
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  Table 2.    Characteristics of the sample entrepreneurs 
 
  Treatment group  Control 
  Total  Participants  Refusers  group 
No. of entrepreneurs  47  41  6  66 
Male (%)  100  100  100  100 
Age (as of 2004)  45.4  44.2  53.6  44.8 
From Ashanti (%)  78.7  75.6  100  86.4 
Years of schooling  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.3 
Apprentice training (%)  91.5  92.7  83.3  87.9 
Years of operation (as of 2004)  13.4  12.2  21.6  14.2 
Machinists (%)  55.3  56.1  50.0  68.2 
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Table 3.    Percentages of firms adopting recommended practices 




Treatment  Control      Treatment  Control 
(1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
Visiting customers (%)      Sales revenues (1,000 GHS)   
2000  19.2  12.2    2000  83.9  93.0 
2002  19.2  13.7    2002  72.1  66.5 
2004  20.3  13.7    2004  60.5  50.0 
2008  51.1  21.2    2008  47.6  30.4 
             
Keeping business records (%)      Value added (1,000 GHS)   
2000  23.4  19.7    2000  53.9  67.3 
2002  23.4  19.7    2002  42.0  46.9 
2004  27.7  24.3    2004  37.2  32.3 
2008  63.8  30.3    2008  30.7  31.1 
             
Analyzing business records (%)    Gross profit (1,000 GHS)   
2000  14.9  12.1    2000  44.6  49.2 
2002  14.9  15.2    2002  34.1  34.3 
2004  21.3  15.2    2004  30.0  23.9 
2008  55.3  18.2    2008  27.2  17.0 
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Table 4. Real equipment investment before and after the training program (GHS) 
 
  Fabricators  Machinists 




p-value   
(3) 
Treatment 
  (4) 
Control 
(5) 
p-value     
(6) 
2006  154.8  40.5  0.276  197.3  487.2  0.386 
2007  108.1  39.5  0.263  258.1  299.6  0.201 
2008  135.5  217.6  0.621  905.0  174.4  0.047 
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Treatment  Control      Treatment  Control 
(1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
Visiting customers (%)      Sales revenues (1,000 GHS)   
  Fabricators  42.9  14.3      Fabricators  33.0  21.0 
  Machinists  57.7  24.4      Machinists  59.4  34.8 
             
Keeping business records (%)    Value added (1,000 GHS)   
  Fabricators  66.7  19.0      Fabricators  17.5  9.2 
  Machinists  61.5  35.6      Machinists  41.3  25.8 
             
Analyzing business records (%)    Gross profit (1,000 GHS)   
  Fabricators  52.4  14.3      Fabricators  15.2  6.6 
  Machinists  57.7  20.0      Machinists  36.8  21.8 
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Table 6.    The IV estimates of the effect of the training program on the participants 
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Panel A: RE-IV model             
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Panel B: FE-IV model             
Fabricator ×Di ×Tt 













Machinist ×Di ×Tt   













             
Hausman test chi 2   
p-value 








Notes.     
The number of observations is 429.    Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors.    *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.    †indicates that model fitted on the data fails to meet 
the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman specification test.   36 
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Number of firms 
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C 
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F 